experiences-what it is like, for example, to experience oneself as being morally obligated to perform an action.
A point of clarification is in order, concerning Neutrality. This answer does not claim that there is no fact of the matter at all about whether or not direct moral experiences carry ontological important; rather, it only claims that there is no introspectively accessible answer to the question about such import. Thus, even if Neutrality is right, there might well be a determinate answer to the second above-mentioned question; but this answer, whatever it is, would not be obtainable just by attending introspectively to one"s own phenomenology.
What we will call the argument from phenomenological introspection has as its conclusion the Affirmative thesis and thus purports to provide a pro tanto reason to favor an ontologically objectivist metaethic. Moreover, this argument purports to get that pro tanto reason directly from the introspectively accessible aspects of moral phenomenology. We ourselves find the issue about moral experience and objective purport somewhat murky, and so much of our work in this paper will be devoted to clarifying the various issues at play in connection with the argument from phenomenological introspection. However, late in the paper, we shall offer a brief defense of the Neutrality thesis. 4 Here is our plan. We begin ( §I) by explaining two conceptions of moral objectivity that are prevalent in contemporary metaethical discussion, one "ontological" and the other "rationalist".
Because talk of "phenomenology" requires clarification, we devote some attention in §II to explaining how we propose to use the term. We will then be in a position to characterize ( §III) more precisely the kind of phenomenological argument we wish to examine-the argument from phenomenological introspection. In §IV, we provide a taxonomy of types of moral experience so that we can zero in on the phenomenology of the type we wish to consider-direct moral experiences of obligation, and in §V we provide two examples of such moral experience. Next ( §VI) we turn to the work of Mandelbaum whose subtle phenomenological characterization of direct moral experiences of obligation we think is correct and provides a basis for exploring the above-mentioned hypotheses regarding ontological objectivity. Having done all of this, in the remaining sections (VII-IX) we proceed to consider the various elements of such experiences in order to evaluate the argument from phenomenological introspection. Our purpose here is to explore how a metaethic that is not ontologically objectivist might provide a basis for challenging the argument. In previous writings we have defended what we call cognitivist expressivism, a view according to which (roughly) moral judgments are genuine cognitive belief states, yet such moral beliefs do not purport to describe some sort of moral reality, and rather they express a certain sort of commitment directed toward a non-moral state of affairs. We employ our cognitivist expressivism as a basis for exploring a non-ontological objectivist line of defense against the argument from phenomenological introspection. 5 As we shall explain, there is more that would need to be done beyond what we undertake in this paper in order to mount a full and convincing response. 
I. Two conceptions of strong moral objectivity
In metaethical discussion there are two main conceptions of objectivity: one ontological, the other rationalist. Both, in their own way, represent what we shall call "strong" conceptionsconceptions that are respectively featured in versions of moral realism and Kantian rationalism. Let us take these in order.
Ontological conception: This conception of moral objectivity is an instance of the sort of objectivity often associated with ordinary physical-object thought and discourse, according to which (roughly) there is an "objectively existing" world of objects and instantiated properties (including relations)
possessed by (or obtaining among) those objects. Often, this conception of "objective existence" is expressed in terms of "mind-independence". 7 But thinking of ontological objectivity in terms of mind-independence is arguably too strong for our present purposes, because on some views, secondary qualities are response-dependent, and hence are not mind-independent, but nevertheless such properties are objective.
Indeed, in metaethics, the thesis that moral properties (instantiations of them) are on an ontological par with response-dependent color properties-that a property like intrinsic value is as much "out there to be experienced" as are instantiations of color properties, even if both are response-dependent-would seemingly secure enough ontological objectivity for morality to combat various forms of metaethical non-cognitivism, relativism, and subjectivism. So, following contemporary metaethical fashion, we can distinguish two forms or grades of ontological moral objectivism ("realism", if you like). According to robust versions, moral properties are a kind of, or analogous to, prototypical primary qualities in that their nature and existence (i.e., whether or not they are instantiated in the world) are not mind-(including human response-) dependent. But according to more modest versions, moral properties are a kind of, or at least have the same sort of ontological status as do, secondary qualities, color properties in particular. Their being responsedependent in a way analogous to color properties (when colors are construed as "secondary qualities") is still sufficient to say of them that when instantiated they are "there to be experienced". 8 It bears emphasis too that the ontological conception of objectivity not only claims that moral judgments have descriptive content-i.e., purport to represent facts consisting of the instantiation of moral properties that are "there to be experienced"-but also claims that such facts are not about certain idiosyncratic psychological states of the agent making the moral judgment (states such as preferences or attitudes of approval/disapproval). Ontological objectivism is a form of metaethical descriptivism, certainly. But it is to be distinguished from the kind of descriptivism that earlier in the century was called "subjective naturalism", which construed moral facts as facts about the psychology of the morally-judging agent.
Rationalist conception: Speaking very generally and somewhat loosely, a realm of thought and discourse is objective, according to this conception, if there is a method of thinking or reasoning whose use would yield (under proper conditions of application) convergence in belief about the subject matter in question. The primary examples here are mathematics and logic. 9 In metaethics, this view is clearly exemplified by Firth"s ideal observer theory and Michael Smith"s metaethical rationalism. 10 According to these views, there is a non-moral conception of rational choice involving norms of practical reasoning whose proper application is sufficient to yield a set of richly determinate moral norms or principles. This form of metaethical objectivity, then, is meant to capture the idea, famously expressed by Kant, that "a law, if it is to hold morally, that is as a ground of obligation, must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the command "thou shalt not lie" does not hold only for human beings, as if other rational beings did not have to heed it…" 11 This idea of requirements holding necessarily for all rational beings is Kant"s idea of those requirements being categorical.
Even though these two conceptions of moral objectivity differ in important ways, they do share a uniting theme: they both try to capture a strong conception of objectivity according to which some realm of thought and discourse is objective only when there is some "reality"-some ontology or method-that "backs up" or "stands behind" such thought and discourse and serves to "make true"
certain claims in the discourse and "make false" other claims.
Before moving on, we make three observations about the relationship between these two conceptions.
First, one might hold that the idea of moral objectivity involves a blend or combination of both kinds of objectivity. J. L. Mackie seemed to think so. 12 He held that moral thought and discourse are committed to the idea that moral requirements are categorical (in the sense just indicated) and to the idea that there are instantiated moral properties (including moral requiredness) that are strongly objective and thus on a metaphysical par with primary qualities. 13 But a secondary quality-like account of moral realism is also (perhaps) likely to attempt a combination: moral properties are "there to be experienced" (ontological claim) and their nature is best captured by a dispositional (response-dependent) account that is basically rationalist. 14 Second, it is possible to hold that there are objective moral properties in the ontological sense and yet deny, or be neutral with respect to, the idea that morality is also objective in the rationalist sense. Suppose, for instance, that moral properties are like secondary qualities in that a proper understanding of them requires referring to how human beings in certain circumstances would respond-without supposing that such properties are there to be experienced by all rational beings.
Perhaps one could wax Humean on this particular matter: we humans have a certain constitutionmaybe a "moral sense" (in a loose sense of the term)-through which we are able to perceive or respond to values that have an ontological status similar to that of colors. The idea would be to combine the claim that there are moral properties possessed by items of evaluation with a rejection of a strong rationalist commitment to claims about all rational beings.
Third, at least prima facie it is possible to embrace the idea that morality is objective in a distinctively rationalist way without supposing that there are moral properties possessed by items of evaluation in the way that an ontological moral realist might suppose. 15 Suppose there are rational norms of obligatoriness that hold for all rational agents. If so, then one can say of some action that it is obligatory, but in saying this one doesn"t have to suppose that in addition to the natural features of the action it has some further property, obligatoriness, that is either identical to, constituted exhaustively by (but not type identical to), or otherwise something "over and above" the natural properties on which this special property supervenes. One example is R. M. Hare"s metaethical view according to which moral judgments are "objective prescriptions". 16 Hare denied that his view involving objective prescriptions committed him to a moral ontology of the sort that would involve moral properties, though he defended the claim that certain features of moral language together with (non-moral) constraints on rational choice yield an essentially utilitarian moral theory.
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contemporary Kantians tout rationalist objectivity as a way of avoiding metaphysical moral realism.
Korsgaard writes: "If ethically good action is simply rational action, we do not need to postulate special ethical properties in the world or faculties in the mind in order to provide ethics with a foundation".
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In sum: (1) there are two main conceptions of strong metaethical objectivity: ontological and rationalist; (2) the ontological conception covers both robust and modest conceptions of what can count as an objective property; (3) it is at least prima facie possible for a metaethical view to combine either form of ontological objectivity with the rationalist conception of objectivity;
however, (4) it is also possible (again prima facie) to embrace the rationalist conception without also embracing the ontological conception (in either of its versions), and the other way around.
So, in light of these conceptions of moral objectivity and their interconnections, one main question about moral phenomenology is whether it embodies or "carries" the pretensions of either sort of objectivity. But before responding to this question, there is preliminary work to be done which will occupy us in the next three sections.
II. Phenomenology: subject matter and method
In recent philosophy of mind, the term "phenomenology" is used sometimes to refer to a type of subject matter, comprising certain aspects of one"s mental life that are available to introspection in a distinctive way. But the term is also used to refer to a method of first-person introspection that allegedly carries with it a special first-person warrant attaching to one"s first-person judgments about one"s own experiences. 19 We think of phenomenology as involving both the subject matter and the method just mentioned. However, in order to make ourselves clear as we proceed, we will use the term "phenomenology" mainly to refer to subject matter, and we will generally use the term "introspection" for the associated method.
In this section we will make some clarificatory remarks about both the subject matter and the method. Part of our purpose is to situate moral phenomenology, as we understand it, within the context of various ongoing debates in contemporary philosophy of mind. As we will make clear, phenomenology generally and moral phenomenology in particular can be characterized in a way that is non-committal about competing positions in several of those debates. Having a characterization of moral phenomenology that is non-committal in the ways we will proceed to explain is important for our purposes; we want to work with a characterization of this area of inquiry that does not beg any questions about potential subject matter and methodology that might taint our investigation of the argument from phenomenological introspection. hoping that she will be the next president. Likewise, there is a distinctive phenomenal character of believing that she will be the next president, different from the phenomenal character of believing that she will not be.) 22 Another disputed issue concerns whether phenomenal consciousness possesses intentionality.
Phenomenology and Phenomenal Consciousness
On some views (in particular, some views that claim that all phenomenal character is sensory or sensory-imagistic), the answer is no: phenomenal character is inherently non-intentional, and mental intentionality is inherently non-phenomenal. On other views, however, all (or virtually all) phenomenal character is inherently intentional, i.e., inherently represents things as being certain ways. 23 Phenomenology, understood as comprising both method and subject matter, can be and should be construed in a way that leaves it uncommitted about these disputed issues. As method, phenomenology does assume that much of one"s conscious (as opposed to unconscious) mental life has a distinctive epistemic status from a first-person perspective: it is directly accessible via introspection. introspectively accessible (as they often are). Of particular relevance here, given our concerns in this paper, are spontaneous, perceptually grounded, moral judgments-as in Harman"s famous example of rounding the corner and finding oneself "just seeing" (as one says) that those hoodlums are doing something wrong in lighting the cat on fire just for fun. 26 The moral judgment is spontaneous, and moreover arises spontaneously from one"s perceptual experience-that"s what matters. Whether or not the wrongness-content is already there in perceptual experience itself, as opposed to being a "cognitive overlay" that only enters in the cognitive transition from perceptual experience to belief, is not important, for present purposes. And again, moral phenomenology per se is methodologically neutral about this. 27 
Phenomenology and Introspective Accessibility
As we have characterized phenomenology, both as method and as subject matter, the issue is left open whether or not all aspects of mentality that fall within the subject matter of phenomenology are reliably introspectable. One might think this couldn"t be so, since the subject matter is supposed to be that which is available to introspection. However, one needs to distinguish 13 between what"s present in experience or experientially given, and what aspects of the latter are reliably ascertainable introspectively. Here are two examples that illustrate this point. You may recall from a famous paper by Roderick Chisholm the case of glancing at a speckled hen. 28 Plausibly, a determinate number of speckles are given in the experience and thus present in experience. But one cannot reliably ascertain that number just via introspection, especially if the experience is fairly short-lived. Here is the second example. Consider the question of whether the content of agentive experience is compatible with state-causal determinism. Plausibly, the answer to that question is fixed just by the nature of the experience itself, as the experience is self-presented to the agent. Arguably, however, introspection alone won"t allow one to reliably ascertain that answer. 29 The fact that certain features can be present in experience without being available to introspection is very important for our purposes in this paper, because it underscores certain potential limitations in the extent to which facts about experiential character can be ascertained just by means of introspectively attending to one"s own phenomenology. Perhaps, for instance, (1) there is a definite fact of the matter about whether or not direct moral experiences carry ontological objective import, and yet (2) this fact if the matter (whatever it is) is not introspectively accessible.
Then the argument for phenomenological inspection will be in trouble-even if those who propound that argument happen to be correct (though we ourselves doubt this) in their contention that direct moral experiences do carry ontological objective purport.
Moral Phenomenology Characterized
We have just been emphasizing how one might understand phenomenology in a manner that is non-commital with respect to a number of contested issues about its subject matter and methodology. To briefly review, the key points are these. Although our characterization of moral phenomenology is neutral about whether there is more to the subject matter than what is reliably introspectively ascertainable, not all the positions mentioned at the outset are thus uncommitted. The thesis called Neutrality, we take it, is committed on this issue (at least on one natural assumption, viz., that direct moral experience either determinately does, or else determinately does not, have ontologically objective purport). The Neutrality picture is this: on the one hand, there is a fact of the matter about whether or not direct moral experience carries ontologically objective purport, but on the other hand, this fact of the matter (whatever it is) is not ascertainable introspectively. We will return to this thesis below in sections VII, VIII, and X.
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III. The argument from phenomenological introspection
As we have said, a main task of this paper is to zero in on a kind of metaethical argument that appeals to an alleged fact about moral phenomenology that allegedly is introspectively accessible (viz., that moral phenomenology carries ontologically objective purport)), as a basis for concluding that the phenomenology of moral experiences provides a pro tanto reason to favor an objectivist metaethic. More precisely, we are interested in a species of phenomenological argument that has the following 5 features.
1. The sort of strong objectivity being argued for is ontological. However, it does not matter for our present purposes whether the argument is being made in favor of robust ontological moral objectivity or for a more modest, sensibility form of such objectivity.
2. The argument is supposed to be a distinctive form of metaethical argument-one that is different from arguments appealing to considerations that concern theoretical semantic issues, or to metaphysical and epistemological issues concerning moral thought and discourse. Those who appeal to matters of moral phenomenology as a basis for defending ontological moral objectivism seem to think that whether or not the phenomenology carries ontological objectivist purport is something that is introspectively accessible. This entails the denial of the Neutrality thesis (N). But suppose that thesis (N) is correct. Presumably, then, mere appeal to introspective awareness will not be sufficient in arguing the pro tanto case 33 for ontological moral objectivism; rather, the objectivist will need to bring to bear other, non-phenomenological considerations (e.g., theoretical questions about moral semantics and about moral metaphysics) to make her case. Once this happens, however, the supposed distinctiveness of the argument from phenomenological introspection is lost.
4. Finally, the argument presupposes that people by and large do share a common moral phenomenology whose elements provide a suitably pre-theoretical basis to which the metaethicist can appeal in making a case for some form of objectivist metaethic. The idea here is that if the argument in question is to have any evidential weight with respect the pro tanto plausibility of competing metaethical views, there must be some metaethical theory-independent facts about the phenomenology to which an appeal can be made and which clearly is fully compatible with some but not all going metaethical theories. Furthermore, for purposes of the phenomenological argument for ontological moral objectivism, there must be some pre-theoretical elements of moral experience that specifically favor an ontologically objectivist metaethical view, rather than, for instance, simply ruling out, say, crude emotivist views.
Summing up, then, the phenomenological argument we wish to consider is properly understood as an argument from introspection that attempts to pick out commonly shared pre-theoretical elements of moral experiences whose ontological objectivist purport is introspectively accessible.
IV. A taxonomy of moral experience
Unfortunately, the term "moral phenomenology", at least as used by philosophers, is accordionlike in its usage. Sometimes, it is used very broadly to refer to any and all of what are considered to be deeply embedded features of moral thought and discourse including: (a) its grammar and logic, (b)
people"s "critical practices" regarding such thought and discourse (including, for example, the assumption that genuine moral disagreements are possible), and (c) the what-it-is-likeness of various moral experiences, including, but not restricted to, concrete experiences of occurrently morally judging some action, person, institution, or other item of moral evaluation. Used very narrowly, the term is used to refer to what we might call "raw affective feeling states" comprising only a proper subset of what-it-is-likeness elements in moral experience. As we explained above in section II, we construe the scope of phenomenology to range over sensory, cognitive, desiderative, as well as affective experiences. So we do plan to use the term neither very narrowly, nor very broadly, but as referring to occurrent mental phenomena that seem constitutive of a broad range of everyday moral experience.
But we need to be more explicit about the kind of moral experience we wish to consider. To do so, we offer a taxonomy of types of moral experience so that we may triangulate a proper part of moral phenomenology that will be the focus later in this paper. 34 Spontaneously reaching out a helping hand to someone about to slip and fall is perhaps an example. We don"t take a stand on whether such cases are properly described as not involving moral judgment (although frankly we doubt it, because we believe that such spontaneous actions are more plausibly construed as the unhesitant effects of moral judgments that are themselves spontaneous rather than deliberative). But in case such actions do meet that description, our focus is properly characterized as being on judgment-involving moral experiences.
First-order and second-order. Certainly experiences of guilt, shame, indignation, and moral anger are important in the study of moral phenomenology. But these moral emotions are typically secondorder moral experiences, since they are directed toward actions and other items of moral evaluation that are judged to be morally wrong or bad. One judges for instance that Tracy has benefited from her moral wrong-doing, which arouses in one the moral emotion of indignation. What we are calling first-order moral judgments, then, are those more basic judgments of obligation and value that may prompt some particular moral emotion of the sort just mentioned. For purposes of this paper, we adopt Mandelbaum"s direct/removed distinction. Our focus will be experiences of the former type about which we will be saying more in later sections.
Intuitive and deliberative moral judgments: Intuitive judgments are psychologically spontaneous in that they occur "without a conscious awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion". 37 Earlier, we mentioned Harman"s example where you round a corner and see a group of hoodlums pore gasoline on a cat and set it on fire. As Harman says, "you do not need to conclude that what they are doing is wrong; you do not need to figure anything out;
you can see that it is wrong". 38 By contrast, deliberative moral judgments result from such activities as consciously searching, weighing evidence, and then inferring a moral conclusion. 39 Here, then, is a visual aid featuring a "set-aside" sequence that summarizes the various distinctions we have been making. As one moves down levels, the arrows pointing to the right point to a category of experience that is being distinguished and set aside from the type of experience under the vertical arrow. Besides allowing us to specify the type of moral experience that will be the focus of our investigation, the above taxonomy is a reminder that one should not assume that moral experience of all types exhibits some core phenomenological elements that unify these experiences as being distinctively moral. 40 This is important for questions about moral objectivity, because it is possible that some types of moral experience include elements that support one conception of moral objectivity, while other moral experiences support a different conception, and perhaps still others support neither conception. Still, it bears emphasis that philosophers who want to argue that moral experience carries ontologically objective purport tend to focus on intuitive moral experiences, while those who are primarily interested in defending the rationalist conception tend to focus instead on the phenomenology of moral deliberation.
Furthermore, and most importantly for present concerns, there is the question of whether some type of moral experience-whether intuitive or deliberative-is neutral with regard to such metaphysical matters and, in particular, whether by introspection alone one can determine whether the experiences in question carry ontological objectivist purport.
As previously mentioned, our focus will be on the what-it-is-likeness of those moral experiences that combine all of the elements in the left hand column. Henceforth, we will refer to such experiences simply as direct experiences of moral obligation, even though we mean only to be focusing primarily on direct and intuitive moral experiences. And, as we have been saying, our main question about such experiences is whether it is introspectively accessible that such experiences carry ontological objective purport.
V. Two examples of direct moral experience
As we have just explained, "direct" moral experience refers to those experiences in which one presently encounters what one takes to be a morally significant situation-a situation that seems to Early on in this conversation it is patently clear to Sophie that now is obviously not the time to share her good news with Audrey-she should wait for a later, more appropriate occasion. Her judgment about waiting is psychologically immediate: she doesn"t consciously rehearse or weigh various considerations; rather, once she hears the voice of Audrey and what Audrey has to say, her judgment to withhold the news is spontaneous.
Rashid"s appointment
It"s Friday, the last day of the semester before finals and Rashid arrives at the department headed for his office bright and early. In past weeks, he has been working furiously on a paper due yesterday which he managed to send off in the 11 th hour. As he walks through his building toward his office, Rashid is experiencing a sense of calm as he reflects with relief on what he"s managed to accomplish during the semester: a paper just completed and sent off, a large introductory course with 200 students that for you was for him a new preparation with many hours spent working up slide presentations, meeting every other week with teaching assistants, a departmental hire-not to mention the damaged roof at home and the time spent wrangling with insurance agents, scheduling repairs, training Barkley, his new Lab puppy, and so on. Over the past two weeks, Rashid has had to ignore some things, including a flood of email which he plans to spend the morning sorting through.
He thinks he really should not have ignored as so much email, but he finds dealing with email a huge distraction, so on occasion he has to take draconian measures and ignore the urgent in order to tackle the truly important.. Dealing with his inbox ought to take about three hours, he guesses, then it"s home again to pack for a short, much needed vacation. Teaching assistants are giving the final examination on Monday, he"ll be back to submit final grades the following Friday. With email out of the way, Rashid will be able to relax. Ah, sometimes life is good; as he unlocks his office door, he now feel positively cheery.
Ready to work, Rashid turns on your computer and as always his daily calendar pops up. He is about to minimize it when he notices an entry for today at 8:30 (in about half an hour)-and he remembers. Many weeks ago (so it seems) he made an appointment with a struggling student who had asked Rashid to help him go over comments he had received from one of his TAs on his most recent paper. Rashid allows students to re-write papers, and this one is due no later than Monday"s final exam period. Rashid"s cheery mood is replaced by a mild sinking feeling as he begins to realize how much time it will likely take to provide useful help to this student. For one thing, he will need to dig out his paper and re-read it, and he can predict that meeting with this student is going to take her friend, what there is to say has to do with psychological matters that are not occurrent and so not part of her on the spot phenomenology. We deny this. We claim that the phenomenology in such cases typically includes quite a lot of rich phenomenological detail-detail that one finds in Mandelbaum"s characterization of the phenomenology of such direct moral experiences.
VI. Mandelbaum's phenomenology of direct moral experiences
According to Mandelbaum, those sorts of direct moral experiences had by Sophie and Rashid involve two "levels"
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: (1) a "felt demand" which is, as he says, "phenomenologically grounded in" (2) an apprehension of a contemplated action being unfitting (relaying her good news in Sophie"s case, not keeping his appointment in Rashid"s case). Let us consider these levels in order.
[A] demand is experienced as a force. Like other forces it can only be characterized through including in its description a reference to its point of origin and to its direction. It is my contention that the demands which we experience when we make a direct moral judgment are always experienced as emanating from "outside" us, and as being directed against us. They are demands which seem to be independent of us and to which we feel that we ought to respond. 42 Three exegetical and interpretative comments are in order here.
First, in further explaining the "external" source of moral demands, Mandelbaum contrasts them with non-moral demands such as those associated with hunger, desire for attention, and sexual arousal which we experience as being "within us". 43 Second, according to Mandelbaum, this sort of desire/urge-independence grounds the sense of "objectivity" one takes one"s direct moral experiences to have. In her conversation, Sophie is aware of various features of her present circumstances that she experiences as "calling for" or demanding that she refrain from saying anything to Audrey about her job advancement. Similarly, Rashid"s reflection on his present circumstances (that includes considerations about his promise to a student, the student"s circumstances, and so forth) are experienced by him as placing a demand on his current behavior "emanating from" these desireindependent facts of his present circumstance. Third, in this phenomenological description, one can distinguish three elements: (1) the raw affective element, which Mandelbaum describes as a felt "pressure" or "tension", 44 (2) the vector-like force aspect of the experience involving as we have seen a sense of its origin and direction, which, being directed against the one making the judgment, is "reflexive", 45 and (3) the overall motivational pull that the contemplated action or omission (in the circumstances) seems to exert. Turning now to the second level of phenomenological description, experiences of felt moral demand, according to Mandelbaum, are phenomenologically grounded in the relational characteristics of fittingness and unfittingness. Mandelbaum writes:
When I experience a demand to keep a promise this demand does not issue from me, but is leveled against me: it is not that I want to give X five dollars which motivated me, but the fact that I feel obligated to keep my promise. The promise itself appears as an objective fact which places a demand upon me whether I want to keep it or not…. In this type of case… it becomes clear that the element of moral demand presupposes an apprehension of fittingness:
the envisioned action places a demand upon us only because it is seen as connected with and fittingly related to the situation which we find ourselves confronting. 46 Since the notion of unfittingness, unlike fittingness, seems intuitively to involve, or be closely related to, the idea of a demand, we take it to be the more basic notion here. 47 Let us now put all of this together. Experiences of direct moral obligation (of the sort Mandelbaum is describing) have these three main features:
 They are ought-judgment involving: an agent having or undergoing such an experience judges of herself that in the present circumstances she ought or ought not perform some action;
 This ought-judgment is part of an overall moral experience in which one experiences a felt demand whose elements include (a) a feeling of pressure, (b) a sense of a vector force whose origin is "external" and is directed at oneself, and (c) an associated motivational pull towards either performing an action or refraining from performing an action.
 This felt demand is experienced as based on an "apprehension" of unfittingness; that is, of a contemplated action or omission being unfittingly related to present circumstances (as one takes them to be).
We submit that Mandelbaum"s phenomenological description does accurately describe most, if not all, of the important elements of people"s typical direct moral experiences (at least we can speak for ourselves). So, in examining this phenomenology for any objective pretensions it may involve, one can ask whether any of these elements carry ontological objective purport. Answering this question, we think, is delicate-which may explain why one finds disagreement among philosophers about how to properly answer the question. Our strategy in trying to answer it will involve two steps.
First, we describe a metaethical view that denies ontological moral objectivity, and that we have elsewhere argued is theoretically attractive for various reasons over and above matters of moral phenomenology; we call it cognitivist expressivism. 48 Second, we proceed to consider the three main features of the phenomenology of direct moral experience, asking about each them, whether alone or in combination, it is an introspectively accessible fact that they carry ontological objective purport. In each case we argue that the answer is negative, on the grounds that cognitivist expressivism, despite repudiating ontological objectivity, can smoothly accommodate the introspectively accessible aspects of the phenomenological features in question.
Note well that this line of argument assumes only that cognitivist expressivism is a credible candidate for being the correct meta-ethical position-not that it is the correct position. If a credible candidate that eschews ontological objectivity can accommodate the introspectively accessible aspects of the relevant phenomenology, then that is enough to show that introspection alone does not yield a positive answer to the question whether moral phenomenology carries ontological objective purport.
These two principal steps in our argument will not quite establish the Neutrality thesis, because they do not preclude the possibility that introspection alone yields a negative answer to the question about ontological objective purport. But the Neutrality thesis does emerge as a corollary, given the very plausible claim (which we ourselves are happy to concede) that various ontologically objectivist meta-ethical positions can also accommodate the introspectively accessible aspects of moral phenomenology. So, by executing our two-step argument, we will have provided a defense of the Neutrality thesis-the claim that introspectively accessible aspects of direct moral experiences do not themselves determine an answer to the question about whether such experiences carry ontological objective purport. And the Neutrality thesis undermines the argument from phenomenological introspection, since that argument rests on the contention that it is an introspectively accessible fact that direct moral experiences carry ontological objective import. Thus, in order to ascertain whether or not experiences carry such purport, one must look to other considerations, including perhaps other types of moral experience and certain non-experiential metaethical considerations.
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VII. The challenge
We think those who defend strong versions of moral objectivism, as well as those who hold error theories, tend to move too quickly from considerations of moral phenomenology to claims about the sort of objective pretensions allegedly possessed by the relevant phenomenology. We say this not only because philosophers have tended not to dwell on phenomenological detail, but also because there is one metaethical position, "cognitivist expressivism", that (a) seems very promising in its capacity to accommodate the facts of moral phenomenology (without overlooking or distorting the facts in question) but which (b) denies that moral judgments are robustly objective. The seeming promise of this view is the basis for raising a challenge to advocates of the phenomenological argument. We challenge them to point to those putative aspects or elements of the phenomenology of direct moral experience whose ontological objectivist purport is introspectively accessible. More specifically, we challenge them to point to putative phenomenological aspects or elements that arguably cannot be accommodated by cognitivist expressivism. To flesh out this challenge, we first present a few of the key elements of cognitivist expressivism, and we then explain why and how this position can smoothly accommodate the phenomenology of direct moral experience.
Very brief introduction to cognitivist expressivism
Cognitivist expressivism is a metaethical position that is largely overlooked because of a widespread but (we claim) mistaken assumption-what we call the "semantic assumption".
According to this assumption, all beliefs are descriptive beliefs. To be more precise: according to this assumption all beliefs are to be understood as being a kind of commitment state-what we call an "is" commitment state-with respect to some way-the-world-might-be content (i.e., some descriptive content).So, just as, for instance, one"s non-moral belief (at some time t) that John took out the trash is to be understood as one"s being is-committed (at t) to a particular descriptive content-that John took out the trash-so it is with moral belief (assuming that moral judgments are beliefs). The belief that John ought to take out the trash is a matter of being is-committed to the following, putative, descriptive content: that it ought to be that John takes out the trash.
In both non-moral and moral cases, then, to believe is to be is-committed to a way the world might be, i.e., to a descriptive content. And so if moral ought-judgments are beliefs, then, according to the semantic assumption, they have moral descriptive content. 50 And if they do, then they purport to be about in the world (instantiated) moral properties. And furthermore, if one denies that there are any such properties instantiated by typical items of evaluation (actions, persons, institutions), then one is committed to an ontological error theory with respect to morals. This was Mackie"s view 51 .
Cognitivist expressivism, on the other hand, rejects the semantic assumption. This view recognizes two importantly different species of belief: in addition to is-commitments (call them isbeliefs), there are ought-commitments (ought-beliefs). The latter sort of commitment states share much of the phenomenology of is-beliefs, and also share many key functional-role features possessed by is-beliefs. But, what distinguishes these two types of belief is the fact that an oughtbelief involves a certain kind of commitment-an ought-commitment-directed toward a non-moral descriptive content. So, on this picture, to believe that John ought to take out the trash, is to be ought-committed to the non-moral descriptive way-the-world-might-be content: that John takes out the trash. You might put the idea here by saying that on this conception of moral belief, the ought is in the attitude, rather than in a descriptive content toward which one is (in an ought-ish way)
committed. 52 This general conception of belief treats moral judgments are genuine beliefs, but strictly speaking it is non-committal with respect to whether moral beliefs also have moral descriptive content. So, the framework could be embraced by a moral realist: the claim would be that the belief that John ought to take out the trash, for example, is both an ought-commitment to the descriptive content that John takes out the trash and an is-commitment to the putative moral-descriptive content that John ought to take out the trash. However, the framework is also compatible with denying that moral beliefs have moral descriptive content. In some of our past writings, we have argued for a non-error version of metaethical irrealism, in which we combine a cognitivist view of moral judgments (i.e., a view that construes them as genuine beliefs) with a non-descriptivist/irrealist view about such judgments. Hence, what we call cognitivist expressivism. On this view, then, there is no such way the world might be morally, as, for example, John"s taking out the trash being an action that ought to occur.
But there is a distinctive type of ought-commitment with respect to a descriptive way the world might be, as in John"s taking out the trash. And this commitment state is a belief.
The challenge
Of course, there is much to do in defending a cognitivist version of expressivism, and elsewhere we have undertaken its defense. 53 The point we wish to make on this occasion is that this sort of view is a metaethical option which promises to accommodate the idea that moral judgments are genuine beliefs (a claim, by the way, that is not beyond question), yet denies that such judgments carry moral descriptive purport (and hence also denies that they carry ontological objective purport).
So, if the phenomenological argument is going to create a presumption in favor of an ontological conception of moral objectivity, its advocates will need to pinpoint features of concrete moral experience with objectivist ontological pretensions that are introspectively evident. Our challenge to the advocates of the phenomenological argument is to pinpoint those features of moral experience that supposedly support strong moral objectivity and argue that it is introspectively manifest that those features really do embody ontological-objectivist pretensions.
VIII. The phenomenology of unfittingness
In addition to the belief-like aspects of ought-judgments that are part of direct moral experiences, we have identified two other general features: (1) they involve a sense of felt demand whose origin is "external", and (2) this felt demand is phenomenologically grounded in a sense ("apprehension") of fittingness. Do either of these features, perhaps in combination, carry ontological objective purport of a sort that is introspectively accessible in direct moral experiences?
Clearly the affective element involved in feeling a demand, which Mandelbaum describes as a pressure or tension, does not itself carry any sort of objective purport. The fact that one feels a pull to perform an action or refrain from performing one is something one often experiences without the experience carrying any presumption of objectivity. I feel tempted by the piece of chocolate cake on the table before me and it is as if it were screaming "Eat me!!!" that seems to be tugging me in its direction. 54 But here one experiences no objective purport.
Of course, the crucial element of felt demand is the "external" origin of the vector-like force; the fact that the demand is, as Mandelbaum says, "emanating from "outside" us", which he glosses as independent of one"s desires. Moreover, this sort of demand is experienced as grounded in one"s sense that such and so action is an unfitting as response to those "external" circumstances. The notions of fittingness and unfittingness are, of course, relational; as Mandelbaum sometimes puts it:
to say that an action is unfitting in relation to a particular set of circumstances, is to say that features of those circumstances "call for" one"s refraining from performing the action. So, if direct moral experiences carry ontological objective purport in a way that is introspectively manifest, then it would seem to be located in the following complex experience: a concrete action being called for by desireindependent features of one"s present circumstances. As explained earlier, if a view like cognitivist expressivism, which denies that moral experiences carry descriptive purport, can accommodate the introspectively manifest aspects in question (regardless of whether this type of view can fully accommodate the phenomenology), and can do so at least as well as a view that attributes to the phenomenology descriptive purport, then we will have secured the Neutrality thesis. To be clear, even if cognitivist expressivism can accommodate the introspectively accessible aspects of moral phenomenology as well as any competing ontological objectivist metaethical view, this does not show that those aspects don"t carry ontological objectivist purport. Rather, what it shows (we claim)
is that whether or not the aspects in question do carry such purport is not something that is introspectively accessible-and that is enough to establish the Neutrality thesis. We now proceed to sketch two interpretations-a cognitivist expressivist interpretation and an ontological objectivist interpretation-to lay bare how they each purport to account for Mandelbaumian direct moral experiences.
Two pictures
We have lately called attention to how cognitivist expressivism understands direct moral ought- objective in the world non-moral features. 55 It bears strong emphasis that this is a two-step construal of direct moral judgment. (The "steps" are conceptually-discernible aspects, which might or might not be sequential links in a causal sequence.)
And the crucial point to appreciate, in distinguishing this non-ontological picture from an ontological picture, is the second step-the coming down because step. Here, it is important to notice that the "because" is not simply a causal "because". To construe it this way would be to confuse So here we have two pictures of the phenomenology of moral unfittingness, and the question is whether there is any introspectively accessible reason (in direct moral experience) to favor one over the other? Our main claim in this paper is that it is not introspectively obvious one way or the other; that in order to decide the issue, one has to import non-phenomenological theoretical considerations into the metaethical debate between the two camps in question.
IX. Moral objectivity with a small 'o' 57
Let us return for a moment to Mandelbaum"s claim that the phenomenology of direct moral experience has an "objective" feel to it. Presumably, the objective feel of such experiences emerges from the aspects of phenomenology we have been describing. Can this sort of feel be accommodated by cognitivist expressivism? Indeed it can. In capturing the objective feel in question, there are two elements of such experiences that combine to carry a sort of non-ontological objectivist feel. First, one experiences oneself as judging in a non-self-privileging way-taking as it were an impartial stance-and so less self-centered and more other-centered. Objective purport for that matter), can capture a notion of moral objectivity that seems to be all that is needed to fully accommodate the introspectively manifest aspects of direct moral experiences.
X. Objections and Replies
We anticipate various objections to the Neutrality thesis, at least as we have defended it. Here, in rapid-fire succession are those objections with our replies.
Mistake: Claim that our phenomenological description of direct moral experiences is mistaken; that we leave out or misdescribe some crucial, introspectively manifest, element that carries ontological objectivist purport and that is introspectively accessible.
Reply: We think of our defense of the Neutrality thesis as one that shifts a burden onto the backs of ontological moral objectivists: so our opponents need to point to those introspectively manifest features of direct moral experiences that cannot be accommodated by cognitivist expressivism as well as they can be accommodated by some form of ontological moral objectivism.
Misdescribe: Claim that it is introspectively obvious that cognitivist expressivism itself just misdescribes the moral phenomenology in question and that it is implausible for this reason. To be more precise, the claim might be it is introspectively manifest that (a) moral judgments are beliefs, and (b) that beliefs are descriptive in their overall content. (To say, for instance, that the belief that John ought to take out the trash is "descriptive in its overall content" is to say that the "that"-clause that John ought to take out the trash characterizes a descriptive way the world might be.)
Reply: Elsewhere, we argue against (b) partly on phenomenological grounds. We will not rehearse those grounds here. But it is worth noting that even if one insists that genuine beliefs must be descriptive, there is a position that is like cognitivist expressivism that construes oughtcommitments as, say, quasi-beliefs, which would do the same work for us in defending the neutrality thesis as does cognitivist expressivism. It is also worth pointing out here that those who just insist that it is introspectively evident to them that their phenomenology does carry objectivist purport may be guilty of introspective confabulation. Generally speaking, it is easy to "read into" one"s phenomenology what is not really there. For instance, I see a saguaro cactus that strikes me (based on how it looks) as being about 45 years old. I say, "Well, it looks about 45 years old." But here it would be implausible to suppose that the property of being roughly 45 years old is something that is introspectively presented to me in my visual experience. Rather, the more intuitively plausible thing to say here is that based on my cacti experience, I"m able to reliably form beliefs about the age of cacti based on what is presented to me in my visual experience. Were I to introspect and conclude that my visual experience presents me with the property of being 45 years old, I would be guilty of introspective confabulation. A similar point holds, we think, for those who would attend to their direct moral experiences and claim that it is introspectively obvious that they are have a divine "stamp" upon them or are of divine origin. And the same sort of confabulation is going on (we would claim) when some folks claim that it is introspectively obvious that their own phenomenology of direct moral experience (and perhaps their concrete moral experience generally) has ontologically objectivist purport. Making this case is (we admit) beyond the scope of this paper; it is something we plan to explore in our work in progress.
Denial: Deny that cognitivist expressivism is an overall plausible metaethical view in ways other than not being able to accommodate the introspectively manifest features of direct moral experience.
Reply: This reply is beside the point. It is enough for our purposes that cognitivist expressivism (assuming it is a coherent metaethical option) can accommodate the introspectively manifest phenomenology of direct moral experiences. In any case, this reply requires going beyond the phenomenology in question and bringing forth various additional theoretical considerations that are relevant for evaluating a metaethical theory. Elsewhere (see note 41) we defend cognitivist expressivism as plausible on general philosophical grounds.
Limit:
Claim that for all we have said, the phenomenology in question may carry ontological objectivist purport, even if such purport is not introspectively accessible.
Reply: We completely agree that this is an option. Our only aim was to take on the argument from introspective phenomenology. So even if moral phenomenology does carry this kind of purport, we think it is important to point out that this putative fact about the phenomenology is not reliably introspectible. And this may explain why moral philosophers disagree about the metaphysical purport of moral experiences of the sort we have considered.
Myopia: There are other types of concrete moral experience and there are other deeply embedded features of moral thought and discourse, including logical embedding, our critical moral practices, and moral deliberation, and some of these features (perhaps in combination) are best accommodated by an ontological objectivist metaethic.
Reply: Perhaps so. But as we"ve said, our aim in this paper was decidedly narrowly focused in order to examining one specific phenomenological argument. We admit that there is more work to be done in defending a metaethical view. It may be, for all we have said, that other types of concrete moral experience involve introspectively manifest aspects that carry ontological objectivist purport, though we doubt it. Having made a case that one type of concrete moral experience is neutral on this issue, the burden is squarely on the shoulders of anyone who thinks some other type of moral experience does carry such purport-all the more so because the kinds of moral judgment we have focused on here, viz., direct judgments of moral obligation, are typically the ones most cited by advocates of the phenomenological argument. As for the thought that one must look beyond concrete moral experience to other features of moral thought and discourse in order to make a pro tanto case for ontological objective purport, we note that this thought is one way of making our main point. As we explained in section III, the argument from introspective phenomenology rests on the assumption that ontological objectivist purport can be read off from the phenomenology of concrete moral experiences without appealing to other features of moral thought and discourse.
Variability: one fundamental problem is that arguably moral phenomenology is theory-ladentheoretical assumptions including metaethical ones saturate moral experience. Thus, in all likelihood, the moral phenomenologies of different individuals will vary with respect to whether their moral experiences carry objective purport in general, and whether their direct moral experiences carry introspectively manifest ontological objectivist purport.
Reply: this raises large methodological issues that we cannot pursue here. 58 However, this objection is bad news for the argument from introspective phenomenology. As we explained in section III, the argument rests on the assumption that the phenomenology of moral experience involves aspects that are pre-theoretically there in the phenomenology, widely shared, and about which we can then theorize. If these assumptions are false, then this is a problem for the argument.
Furthermore, even if there is such variability, there may still be a "core" phenomenological layer that is common. (We ourselves think there is.) If so, then this is where the present debate should be focused.
XI. Conclusion
We began with a commonly expressed appeal to moral experience and its phenomenology as a basis for favoring some form of ontological moral objectivism. We also began with the idea that this sort of argument, so far as we can tell, tends to focus on concrete moral experiences of obligation and value. So we decided to focus on a very common sort of concrete moral experience-what
Mandelbaum calls "direct moral experiences of obligation"-as a basis for exploring what we call the argument from introspective phenomenology. According to this argument, there are introspectively manifest aspects of direct moral experiences that have moral ontological objectivist purport. We challenge this claim. We maintain that the introspectively manifest aspects of such moral experiences do not determine whether they have this kind of objectivist purport. This is our neutrality thesis, which we defended by explaining how our version of cognitivist expressivism can fully accommodate the introspectively manifest data of direct moral experiences, including the objectivist character of such experiences.
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1 Below, in section II, we discuss the subject matter and method of phenomenology in general, and in section IV we say more about the subject matter and method of moral phenomenology. 3 By "introspectively accessible elements" we mean elements that are readily introspectively accessible by people with ordinary introspective acuity-as distinct, for instance, from elements that are introspectively accessible only by people with unusually powerful and accurate introspective skill. 4 We also believe-although we will not argue for this here-that moral experiences in fact do not carry ontological objective purport. But even if we happen to be wrong about this, we still could be right about the Neutrality thesis. The truth of the Neutrality thesis would be enough to undercut the argument from phenomenological introspection-even if that argument"s conclusion happens to be correct. phenomenology is prompted by some remarks by Philip Pettit in conversation.) 31 The following point bears emphasis. If indeed not all aspects of mentality that belong to the subject matter of phenomenology are introspectively accessible (say, because some aspects of phenomenal character are not thus accessible but are present in experience nonetheless), then the distinctive phenomenological method (viz., introspection) will not suffice by itself to answer all pertinent questions about the subject matter. Other methods will need to be brought to bear too, over and above introspection.
takes the act of crushing to be unfitting. So in this case the putting the pigeon out of its misery is experienced as fitting, but the act of crushing is experienced as unfitting. Driver asked whether our model of moral experience, featuring as it does experiences of unfit and fit, can handle this case. Given what we have just said above about the distinction between all-in experiences of moral unfittingness (and fittingness) and cases of experiences of prima facie moral unfittingness, we can say of Driver"s case that on the one hand, given the fact that the act in question is a crushing of a live animal"s skull, one experiences the contemplated action as prima facie unfitting. But, given the fact that the animal is suffering and can"t be saved, one experiences the act as prima facie fitting. So, on our picture one has a tendency to feel ought-committed to crushing the skull and an opposing tendency to feel ought-committed to refraining from crushing the skull. As in typical cases of conflicts of prima facie duties, one must determine which consideration is all-in or most fitting in the circumstances. committed to a descriptive content, which is how cognitivist expressivism understands direct moral oughtjudgments. As we"ve said, the idea is that the "ought" is in the attitude of the psychological state, not in the content toward which the attitude is directed. The formal language also generates constructions corresponding to a whole hierarchy of logically complex commitment states-e. 
